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Lifeguard Operations: Summary 
of Practices at the Athens 2004 Olympics
Stathis Avramidis
In open-water venues, the need for lifeguards is well appreciated around the world. 
Unfortunately, there are still people in countries with a less well-developed sense 
of safety who believe that swimming pools do not present risks and therefore that 
the lifeguards are unnecessary (Avramidis, 2003). For those believing that a swim-
ming pool is merely a harmless “small sea” and therefore a safe place without the 
potential for injury or death, the answer to the question “Do we need lifeguards 
during the Olympic Games?” is often a resounding No!
As one means of refuting that attitude, one need only consider a remarkable 
incident that occurred on the ninth of Greg Louganis’s 11 preliminary dives in the 
3-m springboard competition during the Olympic Games of Seoul on September 
19, 1988. Louganis lacerated his head on the diving board and hit the water with a 
great splash after attempting a reverse 2.5-somersault pike. Fortunately, the accident 
led only to a cut that required temporary sutures and five stitches. Recall, however, 
that several years later the incident took on added meaning when the world’s best 
diver revealed that he had been HIV-positive during those Olympic Games. In his 
autobiography, he admitted that he was panicked that he might cause someone else 
harm. He had wanted to warn the doctor who treated his head injury without wearing 
gloves, but he did not. Fortunately, the physician tested negative for HIV in 1994. 
Everything was so mixed up at that point: the HIV, the shock and embarrassment 
of hitting his head, and an awful feeling that it was all over (Brown, 2007). From 
this single emergency incident that could have led to compression, concussion, 
spinal injury, bleeding, or an HIV infection, one should appreciate that even during 
Olympic Games, aquatic emergencies can and do occur.
Presumably each host country for an Olympic Games tries to learn the lessons 
of the past for organizing better and safer games. One would expect that 16 years 
after the Louganis incident in the Olympic Games of Athens 2004, safety precau-
tions would dominate the aquatic venues.
There was a widely held belief that Greece was not going to even be able to 
organize the Games in time, much less attend to safety issues. Fortunately, this 
belief was proven misguided. All the aquatic facilities were ready on time (Figure 
1). The many human resources were always keen to help, smiling, and exceeding 
the expectations of those who wondered if Greece would be able to provide enough 
volunteers for the Games to run smoothly. The question of whether the lifeguards 
who had to supervise the swimming pools of the Athens Olympic Athletic Center 
were equally ready was still in doubt, however.
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Figure 1 — Venues for the four pool-sport events of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. (a) 





Observations in Athens 2004
This report aims to provide a first-person account regarding all the swimming pool 
aquatic events at both the test events and the actual 2004 Athens Olympic Games 
from a safety perspective and to provide a potential guide to help promote optimal 
practices, as well as avoid similar mistakes, at future Olympic Games.
Lifeguard Staff Selection
The lifeguards for the Games were selected by the organizing committee of each 
aquatic sport (e.g., swimming, diving, synchronized swimming, water polo). Ini-
tially it was thought appropriate to employ lifeguards who were able to work at 
the test event of the specific sport, the training days before the Games, and during 
the actual Olympic Games. Later, it was found that some lifeguards were unwill-
ing to work on all these occasions, so others had to be hired to provide lifeguard 
coverage. Some lifeguards who served the water polo or competitive swimming 
venues were not very strong and were much shorter than the athletes (e.g., several 
lifeguards were only 1.65 m [5 ft 5 in.] tall and some water polo players were 2 
m [6 ft 7 in.] tall). Their lack of size and strength caused doubts by some specta-
tors and organizers about their ability to tow and initiate a successful rescue of 
the bulky, tall athletes who they supervised. Considering the fact that not all the 
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lifeguards had rescue tubes available, one can assume that it would be difficult to 
tow very large athletes if it became necessary. Although as far as it is known there 
is not any scientific study relating the body sizes of the rescuer and the casualty 
with the outcome of the rescue, my practical experience has shown that thin and 
short lifeguards are likely to struggle while towing tall and heavy casualties, and 
therefore, what might initially sound discriminatory, in fact, is not.
Number of Qualified Lifeguards
There were only one or two lifeguards on duty at any aquatic venue during the 
Games (Figure 2). For example, there was one lifeguard for the competitive 
Figure 2 — Lifeguards on duty at the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.
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swimming events, one at the water polo pool, one at the synchronized swimming 
venue, and two at the diving well. This scarcity of lifeguard staff did not allow the 
opportunity for frequent enough guard rotations, with few breaks for meals, to use 
the toilet, or for staffing replacements when someone was ill. Each aquatic event 
worked almost independently from the other events, and the lifeguards were not 
allowed to change from one event to another. Having sufficient staff to allow breaks 
at least once an hour and guard rotations every 30 min (American National Red 
Cross, 1995) would have enabled guards to have more and varied experiences, to 
experience less boredom (Pia, 1984), be more vigilant, be more effective, be able 
to rectify the human factors that make vigilance difficult (Griffiths, 2003), and 
finally be able to apply the 10/20 protection rule (Ellis & White, 1994), the 5-min-
scanning strategy (Griffiths), the RID factor (Pia), and the 4W model of drowning 
(Avramidis, Butterly, & Llewellyn, 2007).
Lifeguard Uniforms
Lifeguards wore the same uniform as the other volunteers. As a consequence, it 
was difficult to distinguish them from the rest of the staff (e.g., athletes and staff-
services assistants, field-of-play staff, training-site staff). Only in the synchronized 
swimming test event was a lifeguard allowed to wear his own red lifeguard uniform. 
Lifeguards complained about the lack of a unique lifeguarding uniform, but they 
were required to wear the official uniform that other volunteers wore despite their 
unique and important role in safeguarding water venues. At least lifeguards could 
have worn a brassard with the indication “lifeguard” similar to those worn by doctors 
and other emergency-services personnel. During the test events lifeguards originally 
were asked to wear street clothing, not appropriate swimwear. On reconsideration, 
this requirement was altered and swimwear was worn under clothes, because the 
risk manager acknowledged that wearing only street clothing was inappropriate 
for the duties lifeguards had to perform.
Lifeguards as Volunteers
During the aquatic events, all lifeguards were volunteers, whereas other emergency-
services staff members were paid (e.g., doctors and policemen were not paid by the 
local Olympic Organizing Committee but were paid by their governing employer). 
The comparison between those two categories of staff (paid and unpaid) did not 
sufficiently and equally motivate all lifeguards to perform well. Lifeguards with 
extrinsic motivation to make money did not always maintain a professional attitude, 
while others with more intrinsic motivation (e.g., desire to perform well) were more 
vigilant and dedicated to their duty.
Lifeguard Staff Qualifications
During the screening process for the indoor aquatic events the volunteers who would 
work as lifeguards had to meet a single criterion: to have any kind of lifeguard 
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qualification, regardless of whether it was for beach or pool lifeguarding. Aside 
from those from Canada, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all the 
Greek lifeguards who worked at the aquatic venues were qualified by their Greek 
lifeguard agencies as beach lifeguards, not pool guards. In addition, although the 
lifeguards from other nations had qualifications with an expiration date, meaning 
that their training had to be updated at least every 2 years, the Greek lifeguard 
qualifications by law never expire (Decree law, 2000). This permanent certification 
raises concerns about the level of the training and the quality of the services that 
they can provide, given the fact that 6 months after the training, only 6.8% of people 
trained in CPR are able to perform it safely and effectively (Handley, 2007).
Lack of a Head Lifeguard
There was no officially established position of head lifeguard during the Games. 
Unfortunately, the responsible persons (i.e., supervisors of field of play) who coor-
dinated the lifeguards at various venues had little or no experience or qualifications 
in aquatics or lifeguarding. As a result this led to situations in which lifeguards 
were told such things as follow:
• “Why do you want two lifeguards for supervising a water polo game? One is 
enough! I think you want to just sit here to watch the games, don’t you?” This 
supervisor obviously did not realize that a frequent rotation among the lifeguard 
team enables a high-level alertness and vigilance (American National Red Cross, 
1995). In the rare case of spinal injury at least two lifeguards are required for 
immobilization (Seghers, 2004). In some aquatic events the lifeguards were 
qualified to do spinal-injury immobilization and in others they were not.
• “Why are you staying longer to get trained in the swimming pool after the 
swimming events? You are not allowed to swim in the pool for training.” Staff 
training is highly recommended to be conducted in sessions that should be 
attended by managers, lifeguard supervisors, head lifeguards, experts in par-
ticular subject matters, risk managers, and human resources representatives 
(American National Red Cross, 2007). One supervisor responsible for volun-
teers did not realize the importance of in-service training at the competitive 
swimming venue.
Absence of Rescue Equipment
Lifeguards were asked to bring their own equipment, but almost none of them had 
things such as rescue tubes or spinal boards. Only a small number of lifeguards 
volunteered to bring some rescue tubes, pocket masks, spinal boards, and cervical 
collars. In contrast, doctors and medical personnel either were provided with all the 
necessary equipment or brought their own (e.g., medications, spinal board, cervical 
collars, defibrillator). During the first days of some test events, there was no elevated 
lifeguard chair or umbrella to provide shade from the sun. Pregame discussions 
should have addressed this matter. Fortunately, this problem was resolved in time 
for the actual Olympic Games.
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In-Service Training
Two days of in-service training took place the month before the Olympic Games. 
Some supervisors responsible for the diving events were not fully certified in 
spinal-injury immobilization. Lifeguards from different countries and organizations 
(e.g., Canada, Greece, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) who knew 
different rescue techniques tried to bring their unique expertise to these training 
sessions. The only reference to lifeguards in their Olympic Games training manu-
als was that “they should always be alert during the training and the games and 
that they were responsible for bringing the injured athlete out of the water when 
needed” (Organizing Committee of Athens 2004 Olympic Games, 2004, p. 58). 
Spinal-injury-management training took place in the diving pool under the com-
mand of a medical doctor who accepted the proposal from other lifeguard instructors 
to use a modification of the Swimming Teachers’ Association’s (U.K.) National 
Rescue Standard program for two-people spinal-injury-management technique in 
deep water. These techniques required one lifeguard to slide in the water, dive to 
the bottom of the pool and bring the injured athlete to the surface while maintaining 
in-line stability using a head splint. On reaching the surface, the lifeguard should 
apply a cervical collar and then, assisted by the second lifeguard, put the athlete 
on a spine board (Swimming Teachers’ Association, 2004; Figure 3).
Figure 3 — In-service training for spinal injuries using a modification of the Swimming 
Teachers Association two-person spinal-injury-management technique adapted for deep 
water.
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Incidents During the 2004 Athens Olympic Games
I observed the following minor incidents during the diving, water polo, synchronized 
swimming, and competitive swimming events at the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, 
indicating that lifeguard supervision is always needed around aquatic environments, 
even during the Olympic Games.
• In the test event for synchronized swimming during training, an athlete jumped 
on her teammate’s back, scratching her eyebrow and causing minor bleeding. 
She did not require rescuing and came out of the water unassisted.
• On August 24, seven soggy American water polo players crawled out of the 
pool, their backs to the celebration that was making waves at the other end of 
the pool. One of the players, Ericka Lorenz, had four scratches on her neck 
(one still bleeding), received during their defeat in the women’s semifinal water 
polo match (Hac, 2004).
• During the competitive swimming events, a piece of plastic got into the swim-
ming pool. Because there was no pole (e.g., shepherd’s crook) to drag it out, 
the umpire ordered the lifeguard to jump into the pool and remove it.
• On August 17, a surprising event occurred during the men’s synchronized 3-m 
springboard finals. The Chinese champion pair who were the favorites to win 
the event were awarded 0.0 points from all judges because of a deficient dive 
that ended in a belly flop. This indicates that anyone, regardless of level and 
training, occasionally can suffer an accident that might lead to an injury. For-
tunately, in this case, only their pride was injured, not their physical bodies.
• In the same event, a Russian pair’s dive ended with a very noisy water entry, 
as a result of one of them hitting the diving board with his legs, making the 
entire crowd gasp. The director of diving told the lifeguard, “Be ready and be 
close to the water in case you need to jump in.” Fortunately the diver did not 
experience any serious injury and the lifeguard or other medical assistance 
was not required.
• The strangest incident of the Olympic Games from a lifeguard perspective 
took part during another diving event. During the game, a spectator distracted 
a security guard who was inside the pool area near the fence. Meanwhile, a 
friend who was a streaker, dressed only in a tutu, clown shoes, and a tattoo 
advertising an internet casino, jumped over the fence and into the pool area 
behind the guard and climbed the diving platform. The same man had appeared 
at the world figure skating championships in Germany the previous March 
(Golden Palace, 2004). He started posing and dancing for a short time before 
jumping into the water, after which he waved to the spectators. The director of 
diving ordered the lifeguard on duty to remove the streaker from the pool. The 
lifeguard hesitated for several seconds, considering whether it was appropriate 
to jump in or not and engage the intruder. Finally, leaving his rescue tube on 
the deck, he dove in and approached the man. In an effort to make the man to 
leave the pool the announcer told the spectators, “Let’s clap to congratulate 
him for his entertaining show.” When the spectators started clapping and as 
the lifeguard approached the intruder, he moved toward the side of the pool. 
A security officer directed the lifeguard, “It’s OK. Don’t touch him!” The 
intruder left the water and was escorted away by safety officers.
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Recommendations for Future Olympic Games
The overall impression was that the 2004 Athens Olympic Games were very suc-
cessful and safe. Based on my direct experiences at the Games, the following is a 
list of actions that should be taken in the future for proactively organizing Olympic 
Games or other major aquatic events:
• Develop written operating procedures including an emergency-action plan and 
daily operating procedures so that each lifeguard can anticipate in advance 
how to react to a variety of possible occurrences.
• Employ sufficiently experienced lifeguards, who should be paid by the local 
Olympic Organizing Committee (or designee) and who are certified and special-
ized in swimming pool emergencies. There should be backup staff scheduled 
to permit regular (30- to 60-min) rotations and to cover in the event of illness 
or absence.
• Purchase all necessary lifesaving equipment including rescue tubes, spinal 
boards, automated external defibrillators, and first-aid supplies from the budget 
of the local Olympic Organizing Committee or their designee.
• Employ a head lifeguard, who should be responsible for coordinating the entire 
lifeguard team for all aquatic events and at all water venues. A head lifeguard 
should have extensive experience hiring appropriately qualified lifeguards, 
organizing and conducting staff in-service training, and creating successful 
interactions among lifeguards, the risk manager, and emergency-medical 
personnel.
• Plan for and conduct proper and frequent in-service training with all the neces-
sary lifesaving equipment provided by the organizing committee.
• Maintain appropriate security procedures and employ sufficient security staff 
to prevent intruders from disrupting any events.
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